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Abstract	  	  
This	  essay	  is	  a	  review	  of	  Edna	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  pathbreaking	  1978	  book,	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Norms.	  It	  urges	  that	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  treatment	  of	  PD	  
norms	  and	  coordination	  norms	  remains	  convincing,	  but	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
work	  remains	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  norms	  of	  partiality,	  where	  adaptive	  
preferences	  and	  preference	  falsification	  play	  significant	  roles.	  It	  also	  
emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  causal	  and	  functional	  
accounts	  of	  norms.	  	   Before	  her	  premature	  death	  in	  2010,	  Edna	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  elegant	  and	  highly	  original	  essays,	  focused	  about	  all	  on	  rationality	  and	  its	  limits.	  Hers	  is	  the	  best	  philosophical	  work	  on	  invisible-­‐hand	  explanations1	  and	  presumptions.2	  With	  Sidney	  Morgenbesser,	  she	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  important	  distinction	  between	  choosing	  (deciding	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons)	  and	  picking	  (as	  in	  flipping	  a	  coin).3	  In	  her	  later	  years,	  she	  examined	  how	  rational-­‐choice	  theory	  might	  be	  defeated	  when	  people	  make	  Big	  Decisions,	  where	  their	  values	  and	  even	  their	  character	  are	  on	  the	  line.4	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  also	  explored,	  with	  grace	  and	  sensitivity,	  the	  idea	  of	  considerateness	  and	  its	  role	  both	  in	  daily	  life	  and	  within	  the	  family.5	  (This	  may	  be	  her	  finest	  work.)	  None	  of	  her	  essays	  shouts	  from	  the	  rooftops,	  but	  all	  of	  them	  leave	  large	  subjects	  much	  richer	  than	  they	  were	  before	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  some	  of	  them	  create	  new	  subjects	  altogether.	  They	  have	  a	  timeless	  quality,	  and	  they	  also	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  synergy;	  at	  some	  point,	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  collected	  into	  a	  single	  volume.	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   In	  the	  meantime,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  has	  just	  published	  the	  first	  paperback	  edition	  of	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  pathbreaking	  book,	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Norms	  (1978),	  which	  has	  a	  strong	  claim	  to	  having	  spurred	  the	  last	  decades’	  outpouring	  of	  work	  on	  that	  topic.	  Almost	  four	  decades	  later,	  the	  book	  repays	  careful	  reading,	  not	  least	  (I	  think)	  because	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  norms	  of	  partiality,	  which	  has	  been	  much	  neglected,	  and	  which	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  unresolved	  problems	  in	  social	  theory.	  	  	   Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  sees	  her	  work	  as	  “an	  essay	  in	  speculative	  sociology”	  (p.	  1),	  designed	  to	  understand	  both	  the	  rise	  and	  the	  function	  of	  social	  norms.	  She	  describes	  her	  thesis	  as	  this:	  “certain	  types	  of	  norms	  are	  possible	  solutions	  to	  problems	  posed	  by	  certain	  types	  of	  social	  interaction	  situations”	  (p.	  1).	  Her	  claim	  is	  one	  of	  “rational	  reconstruction,”	  involving	  not	  historical	  evidence,	  or	  indeed	  anything	  at	  all	  empirical,	  but	  instead	  a	  plausible	  claim	  of	  how	  a	  practice	  or	  a	  phenomenon	  might	  have	  emerged.	  She	  treats	  three	  such	  situations	  as	  paradigmatic	  or	  “core,”	  involving	  prisoner’s	  dilemmas,	  coordination,	  and	  inequality.	  In	  all	  three	  situations,	  familiar	  social	  norms	  turn	  out	  to	  resolve	  the	  specified	  problems.	  In	  her	  view,	  norms	  typically	  have	  that	  effect	  insofar	  as	  they	  impose	  “a	  significant	  social	  pressure	  for	  conformity	  and	  against	  deviation,”	  alongside	  a	  “belief	  by	  the	  people	  concerned	  in	  their	  indispensability	  for	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  society,”	  and	  an	  expectation	  of	  clashes	  between	  the	  dictates	  of	  norms	  “on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  personal	  interests	  and	  desires	  on	  the	  other”	  (p.	  13).	  	  	   With	  respect	  to	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  situations,	  the	  central	  argument	  is	  straightforward.	  	  If	  people	  are	  facing	  such	  situations,	  they	  cannot	  easily	  produce	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  state	  of	  affairs	  without	  “a	  norm,	  backed	  by	  appropriate	  sanctions”	  (p.	  22).	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  to	  pay	  one’s	  income	  tax,	  to	  vote	  in	  a	  general	  election,	  to	  keep	  a	  promise,	  or	  to	  cut	  through	  a	  neighbor’s	  well-­‐tended	  lawn.	  In	  each	  case,	  a	  PD	  norm	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  especially	  important,	  all	  the	  more	  so	  “the	  larger	  and	  the	  more	  indeterminate	  the	  class	  of	  participants,	  and	  the	  more	  frequent	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  dilemma	  among	  them”	  (p.	  25).	  	  	   In	  short,	  norms	  operate	  as	  stabilizing	  devices.	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  understands	  the	  logically	  faulty	  but	  widespread	  generalization	  argument	  (“what	  if	  everyone	  did	  that?”)	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  psychological	  power	  and	  hence	  the	  utility	  of	  PD	  norms.	  She	  also	  emphasizes	  the	  important	  but	  underappreciated	  fact	  that	  it	  sometimes	  make	  sense	  for	  norms	  or	  law	  to	  keep	  people	  in	  PD	  situation;	  consider	  the	  antitrust	  laws	  (pp.	  44-­‐45).	  	  	   Though	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  devotes	  a	  lot	  of	  pages	  to	  coordination	  norms,	  they	  	  are	  in	  a	  sense	  much	  simpler,	  because	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  parties	  coincide.	  In	  the	  pure	  version,	  we	  both	  (or	  all)	  want	  to	  meet	  somewhere	  in	  New	  York	  City;	  the	  question	  is	  where.	  A	  coordination	  norm	  tells	  us	  to	  meet	  at	  Grand	  Central	  Station.	  In	  the	  non-­‐pure	  version,	  our	  convergence	  of	  interests	  is	  not	  exactly	  perfect	  (maybe	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Penn	  Station	  is	  a	  bit	  easier	  for	  you),	  but	  it	  is	  close	  enough,	  because	  we	  care	  more	  about	  coordinating	  than	  we	  do	  about	  getting	  our	  way	  on	  exactly	  where.	  	  	   Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  urges	  that	  in	  recurring	  coordination	  problems,	  people	  tend	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  successful	  solution,	  which	  then	  becomes	  a	  norm.	  Familiar	  examples	  include	  norms	  involving	  dress,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  legal	  tender	  (and	  hence,	  perhaps,	  the	  rise	  of	  money),	  driving	  on	  the	  left	  (or	  right),	  and	  etiquette.	  In	  novel	  coordination	  problems,	  bottom-­‐up	  development	  of	  norms	  is	  not	  possible,	  and	  hence	  “a	  solution	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  dictated	  by	  a	  norm	  issued	  specifically	  for	  that	  purpose	  by	  some	  authority”	  (p.	  83).	  In	  either	  case,	  she	  insists	  that	  a	  coordination	  norm	  is	  no	  mere	  regularity	  of	  behavior.	  It	  is	  “supported	  by	  social	  pressure”	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  “it	  even	  slightly	  changes	  the	  corresponding	  pay-­‐off	  matrix”	  by	  making	  a	  “particular	  coordination	  equilibrium	  a	  somewhat	  more	  worthwhile	  outcome	  to	  be	  aimed	  at	  than	  it	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been”	  (p.	  87).	  	  Here	  she	  understates;	  if	  a	  norm	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  lot	  of	  social	  pressure,	  it	  might	  do	  far	  more	  than	  “slightly”	  change	  people’s	  payoffs.	  	  In	  an	  instructive	  brief	  discussion,	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  urges	  that	  for	  the	  individual	  conformist,	  all	  decisions	  are,	  in	  essence,	  coordination	  problems,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  goal	  is	  “to	  meet	  the	  others	  in	  their	  choices”	  (p.	  93).	  From	  that	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  conformist	  faces	  “a	  unilateral	  coordination	  problem”	  (p.	  94).	  We	  can	  even	  imagine	  “a	  society	  composed	  entirely	  of	  conformists,”	  whose	  members	  think	  that	  conformity	  matters	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  thus	  raising	  the	  question	  whether,	  in	  such	  a	  society,	  any	  decision	  at	  all	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  coordination	  problem.	  The	  thought	  experiment	  is	  both	  interesting	  and	  important,	  because	  some	  groups	  are	  a	  lot	  like	  that.	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  urges	  that	  if	  “it	  is	  common	  knowledge	  in	  this	  society	  that	  they	  are	  all	  avowed	  conformists	  who	  are,	  moreover,	  content	  to	  act	  that	  way,”	  then	  coordination	  problems	  are	  indeed	  pervasive.	  	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  contemporary	  reader,	  her	  most	  novel	  and	  challenging	  (if	  not	  entirely	  satisfying)	  discussion	  involves	  norms	  of	  partiality.	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  begins	  by	  assuming	  a	  status	  quo	  of	  inequality,	  “such	  that	  one	  party	  is	  more	  favourably	  placed	  than	  the	  other”	  (p.	  134).	  As	  she	  sets	  up	  the	  situation,	  the	  disfavorably	  placed	  party	  is	  quite	  aware	  of	  being	  disfavorably	  placed	  and	  wants	  to	  improve	  his	  position.	  She	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  goal	  might	  be	  to	  improve	  either	  absolute	  position	  (for	  example,	  by	  having	  more	  opportunities	  or	  resources)	  or	  relative	  position	  (by	  narrowing	  the	  gap	  with	  the	  other	  party,	  holding	  absolute	  position	  constant).	  By	  contrast,	  the	  favorably	  placed	  party	  wishes	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  In	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  account,	  the	  most	  interesting	  problems,	  for	  these	  particular	  players,	  have	  two	  features.	  First,	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  in	  game-­‐theoretical	  equilibrium,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  neither	  side	  can	  improve	  his	  absolute	  position	  by	  a	  unilateral	  deviance.	  Think,	  for	  example,	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  employers	  and	  employees,	  or	  husbands	  and	  wives.	  Second,	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  strategically	  unstable,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  disfavorably	  placed	  party	  might	  be	  able	  to	  improve	  his	  relative	  
	   4	  
position,	  but	  sacrifice	  his	  absolute	  solution	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  short-­‐run),	  by	  a	  unilateral	  move	  (or	  rebellion).	  Think,	  for	  example,	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  strike	  or	  to	  leave	  the	  marriage.	  We	  can	  imagine	  many	  real-­‐world	  analogues,	  including	  not	  only	  labor	  rights	  and	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  the	  family,	  but	  also	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  groups	  that	  consider	  whether	  to	  engage	  in	  civil	  disobedience.	  	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  question	  is	  this:	  How	  can	  the	  favored	  party	  try	  to	  stabilize	  the	  status	  quo?	  There	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  possibilities.	  One,	  of	  course,	  is	  to	  use	  force.	  Another	  is	  “to	  share	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  his	  favored	  positions	  with	  the	  other	  party”	  (p.	  169).	  Another	  is	  to	  conceal	  and	  blur	  his	  favored	  position	  (an	  especially	  interesting	  and	  potentially	  successful	  strategy).	  Another	  is	  to	  try	  to	  exclude	  himself	  from	  the	  frame	  of	  reference	  used	  by	  the	  disfavored	  part.	  Yet	  another	  is	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  convince	  the	  disfavored	  party	  that	  he	  is,	  in	  fact,	  much	  better	  off	  than	  he	  was	  in	  the	  past	  (or	  might	  be	  under	  some	  other	  arrangement).	  All	  of	  these	  strategies	  are	  familiar	  from	  past	  movements	  for	  equality,	  and	  all	  have	  both	  potential	  and	  risks.	  	  But	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  particular	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  use	  of	  norms	  of	  partiality,	  which	  operate	  to	  stabilize	  otherwise	  volatile	  situations.	  As	  examples,	  she	  points	  in	  particular	  to	  norms	  associated	  with	  property,	  including	  prohibitions	  on	  trespass	  and	  “the	  inheritance	  institution,”	  which	  she	  says	  are	  meant	  “to	  preserve,	  protect,	  and	  perpetuate	  the	  position	  of	  the	  ‘haves’	  –	  and	  their	  descendants	  –	  in	  states	  which	  are	  inherently	  states	  of	  inequality”	  (p.	  173).	  She	  acknowledges	  that	  norms	  of	  this	  kind	  might	  take	  the	  form	  of	  law	  or	  instead	  customs.	  But	  she	  insists	  that	  in	  any	  case,	  an	  unequal	  status	  quo	  is	  often	  able	  to	  perpetuate	  itself	  only	  because	  of	  their	  support.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  favored	  party,	  a	  special	  virtue	  of	  norms	  of	  partiality	  is	  that	  in	  many	  cases,	  “the	  air	  of	  impersonality	  remains	  intact	  and	  successfully	  disguises	  what	  underlies	  the	  partiality	  norm,	  viz.	  an	  exercise	  of	  power”	  (p.	  189).	  In	  this	  respect,	  norms	  of	  partiality	  are	  altogether	  different	  from	  PD	  norms	  and	  coordination	  norms.	  	  In	  important	  ways,	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  brilliant	  discussion	  remains	  largely	  authoritative,	  but	  it	  also	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  unanswered	  questions.	  Let’s	  back	  up	  from	  the	  particular	  claims	  and	  notice	  that	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  could	  be	  clearer	  about	  what,	  exactly,	  ensures	  that	  her	  categories	  of	  norms	  will	  have	  a	  stabilizing	  effect.	  She	  often	  speaks	  of	  social	  pressure,	  which	  leaves	  open	  the	  question:	  Would	  people	  follow	  norms	  if	  no	  one	  were	  watching?	  For	  PD	  norms,	  most	  of	  us	  would:	  You	  pay	  your	  taxes	  because	  it	  is	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	  not	  because	  other	  people	  would	  think	  less	  of	  you	  if	  you	  didn’t.	  The	  same	  is	  at	  least	  sometimes	  true	  of	  norms	  of	  partiality.	  If	  you	  are	  supposed	  to	  show	  deference	  to	  those	  of	  higher	  status	  (your	  boss,	  your	  teacher,	  a	  senator),	  you	  might	  well	  have	  internalized	  that	  practice,	  so	  that	  you	  would	  feel	  that	  you	  had	  done	  something	  wrong	  if	  you	  did	  not.	  (The	  term	  “impertinence”	  captures	  the	  idea.)	  	  In	  Explaining	  Social	  Behavior,	  Jon	  Elster	  contends	  that	  “social	  norms	  operate	  through	  the	  emotions	  of	  shame	  in	  the	  norm	  violator	  and	  of	  contempt	  in	  the	  observer	  
	   5	  
of	  the	  violation”	  (p.	  355).	  This	  understanding	  helps	  to	  clarify	  much	  of	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  discussion,	  and	  it	  puts	  some	  pressure	  on	  her	  discussion	  of	  coordination	  norms.	  If	  the	  most	  sensible	  meeting	  place	  in	  New	  York	  City	  is	  Grand	  Central	  Station,	  and	  if	  you	  are	  the	  only	  one	  in	  a	  group	  of	  friends	  to	  show	  up	  at	  Penn	  Station,	  you	  might	  feel	  stupid,	  but	  shame	  would	  be	  a	  bit	  excessive.	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  tries	  to	  distinguish	  between	  coordination	  norms	  and	  conventions,	  but	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  that	  the	  effort	  is	  successful.	  	  	  	  For	  all	  three	  classes	  of	  norms,	  she	  is	  correct	  to	  emphasize	  the	  likely	  relevance	  of	  social	  pressure,	  but	  over	  the	  last	  decades,	  we	  have	  learned	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  that	  ambiguous	  idea.	  For	  example,	  Elster	  emphasizes	  ostracism,	  avoidance,	  and	  (perhaps	  more	  important)	  perceived	  contempt,	  and	  Ernst	  Fehr	  explores	  “altruistic	  punishment”	  (as	  when	  norm-­‐enforcers	  take	  action	  at	  their	  own	  expense)	  and	  the	  anticipation	  of	  such	  punishment	  by	  would-­‐be	  norm	  violators.	  We	  continue	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  shame,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  one’s	  own	  norm	  violations,	  even	  when	  no	  such	  pressure	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  bear.	  And	  of	  course	  legal	  norms,	  which	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  sometimes	  seems	  to	  conflate	  with	  social	  norms,	  have	  an	  enforcement	  machinery	  of	  their	  own,	  even	  if	  they	  grow	  out	  of	  or	  codify	  social	  norms.	  	  As	  her	  title	  suggests,	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  norms,	  not	  only	  with	  their	  functions.	  The	  whole	  idea	  of	  “rational	  reconstruction”	  is	  designed	  to	  see	  how	  norms	  might	  plausibly	  have	  come	  about.	  (In	  this	  connection,	  she	  offers	  not	  the	  first	  but	  perhaps	  the	  clearest	  game-­‐theoretic	  reading	  of	  Hobbes,	  in	  accordance	  with	  which	  government	  could	  emerge	  from	  a	  generalized	  PD-­‐structured	  problem	  faced	  by	  humanity	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature.)	  Those	  who	  emphasize	  rational	  reconstruction	  think	  that	  it	  is	  valuable	  to	  describe	  “the	  essential	  features	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  such	  an	  event	  could	  occur:	  it	  is	  a	  story	  of	  how	  something	  could	  happen	  –	  and	  when	  human	  actions	  are	  concerned,	  of	  what	  is	  the	  rationale	  of	  its	  happening	  that	  way	  –	  not	  of	  what	  did	  actually	  take	  place”	  (p.	  1;	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  I	  might	  be	  missing	  something	  here,	  but	  mightn’t	  it	  be	  simpler	  and	  better	  to	  dispense	  with	  any	  kind	  of	  causal	  claims,	  even	  hypothetical	  ones,	  thus	  jettisoning	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  norms,	  and	  to	  speak	  instead	  of	  their	  functions?	  	  	  A	  possible	  response	  (and	  it	  might	  be	  a	  good	  one)	  is	  that	  if	  we	  are	  speaking	  of	  PD	  norms	  and	  coordination	  norms	  –	  and	  perhaps	  norms	  of	  partiality	  as	  well	  –	  their	  functions	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  their	  emergence	  or	  at	  least	  their	  stability	  over	  time.	  Perhaps	  spontaneous	  orders	  generate	  norms	  of	  this	  kind.	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  work	  so	  suggests,	  and	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  superb	  work	  on	  invisible-­‐hand	  explanations	  bears	  on	  the	  possibility	  (and	  also	  raises	  doubts	  about	  it).	  But	  the	  basic	  claim	  raises	  a	  host	  of	  questions,	  and	  they	  are	  empirical	  rather	  than	  conceptual	  in	  nature.	  	  	  Taken	  in	  conceptual	  terms,	  and	  as	  analysis	  of	  functions	  rather	  than	  emergence,	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  discussion	  of	  PD	  norms	  and	  coordination	  norms	  remains	  broadly	  convincing	  (and	  contains	  many	  superb	  refinements	  that	  I	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  capture	  here).	  With	  respect	  to	  norms	  of	  partiality,	  of	  course,	  there	  is	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much	  more	  to	  say.	  Sure,	  some	  social	  norms	  stabilize	  situations	  of	  inequality,	  but	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  acknowledges	  her	  own	  struggle	  to	  identify	  clear	  examples.	  Private	  property	  and	  rights	  of	  inheritance	  are	  protected	  by	  law,	  not	  only	  and	  perhaps	  not	  mostly	  by	  social	  norms.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  logic,	  rights	  of	  inheritance	  have	  to	  flow	  through	  legal	  institutions,	  and	  in	  advanced	  nations,	  no	  stable	  social	  norms	  specifies	  the	  content	  of	  those	  rights.	  In	  any	  case,	  private	  property	  can	  easily	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  generalized	  PD	  problem,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  taken	  as	  part	  of	  private	  property,	  rights	  of	  inheritance	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  just	  the	  same	  way.	  	  	  With	  respect	  to	  norms	  of	  partiality,	  there	  is	  an	  imperfect	  match	  between	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  very	  brief	  list	  of	  concrete	  examples	  and	  her	  highly	  instructive,	  extended	  statement	  of	  the	  abstract	  problem.	  In	  practice,	  norms	  that	  stabilize	  unequal	  situations	  might	  well	  be	  harder	  to	  maintain	  than	  PD	  norms	  and	  coordination	  norms	  –	  unless	  those	  norms	  are	  truly	  perceived	  as	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  those	  who	  seem	  to	  be	  disadvantaged	  by	  them	  (if,	  for	  example,	  they	  improve	  absolute	  position).	  To	  make	  progress,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  have	  a	  not-­‐short	  catalogue	  of	  possible	  norms	  of	  partiality,	  understood	  as	  norms	  (Elster’s	  sense)	  that	  disfavored	  people	  actually	  accept,	  or	  at	  least	  act	  as	  if	  they	  accept	  (because	  of	  a	  fear	  of	  sanctions).	  	  	  Here’s	  a	  possible	  direction.	  After	  the	  appearance	  of	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit’s	  book,	  Elster,6	  Amartya	  Sen,	  and	  others	  have	  explored	  the	  idea	  of	  “adaptive	  preferences,”	  by	  which	  disadvantaged	  people	  end	  up	  preferring	  their	  disadvantageous	  circumstances,	  and	  do	  not	  rebel	  against	  them.	  If	  your	  culture	  is	  pervaded	  by	  inequality,	  and	  if	  prevailing	  norms	  support	  that	  equality,	  you	  might	  not	  question	  them,	  and	  you	  might	  even	  end	  up	  accepting	  them	  (in	  part	  to	  reduce	  cognitive	  dissonance).	  Describing	  the	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  pre-­‐Revolutionary	  America,	  Gordon	  Wood	  writes	  that	  those	  "in	  lowly	  stations	  .	  .	  .	  developed	  what	  was	  called	  a	  'down	  look,'	  and	  "knew	  their	  place	  and	  willingly	  walked	  while	  gentlefolk	  rode;	  and	  as	  yet	  they	  seldom	  expressed	  any	  burning	  desire	  to	  change	  places	  with	  their	  betters."7	  In	  Wood's	  account,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  "comprehend	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  that	  premodern	  world	  until	  we	  appreciate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  many	  ordinary	  people	  still	  accepted	  their	  own	  lowliness."	  Here,	  then,	  is	  a	  concrete	  account	  of	  adaptive	  preferences	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  norms	  of	  partiality.	  	  Alternatively,	  you	  might	  end	  up	  silencing	  yourself,	  and	  hence	  decline	  to	  rebel,	  not	  because	  you	  accept	  your	  own	  status,	  but	  simply	  because	  of	  reputational	  and	  other	  sanctions	  associated	  with	  rebellion	  –	  producing	  what	  Timur	  Kuran	  calls	  “preference	  falsification,”	  which	  can	  contribute	  to	  social	  stability.8	  Consider	  forms	  of	  inequality	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex,	  sexual	  orientation,	  and	  disability	  (physical	  and	  mental).	  Both	  adaptive	  preferences	  and	  preference	  falsification	  have	  played	  large	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Jon	  Elster,	  Sour	  Grapes	  (1983).	  7	  Gordon	  Wood,	  The	  Radicalism	  of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  (1993).	  8	  Timur	  Kuran,	  Private	  Truths,	  Public	  Lies	  (1998).	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roles,	  and	  they	  help	  to	  maintain	  norms	  of	  partiality.	  Both	  empirically	  and	  conceptually,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  to	  do	  on	  this	  subject.	  	  	   In	  her	  final	  essay	  on	  considerateness,	  published	  posthumously	  and	  over	  thirty	  years	  after	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Norms,	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  turned	  to	  an	  intriguing	  set	  of	  norms,	  by	  which	  people	  contribute	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  others	  at	  low	  cost	  to	  themselves.	  She	  urged,	  quite	  boldly,	  that	  “considerateness	  is	  the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  our	  relationships	  are	  to	  be	  organized	  in	  both	  the	  thin,	  anonymous	  context	  of	  the	  public	  space	  and	  the	  thick,	  intimate	  context	  of	  the	  family.”9	  	  Focused	  not	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  norms	  but	  their	  consequences,	  she	  notes	  that	  while	  a	  lover	  might	  send	  “a	  bouquet	  of	  a	  hundred	  roses,”	  families	  typically	  have	  smaller,	  more	  routinized	  gestures	  and	  “deals,”	  which	  reflect	  “their	  preferences	  and	  aversions,	  their	  different	  competencies	  and	  skills,	  their	  relative	  strengths,	  weaknesses,	  and	  vulnerabilities,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  fantasies,	  whims,	  and	  special	  needs.”	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  argues	  that	  in	  that	  context,	  it	  may	  be	  too	  much	  to	  aspire	  to	  justice,	  but	  a	  good	  family	  can	  certainly	  be	  fair.	  	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  family,	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  was	  focused	  both	  on	  mutual	  advantage	  and	  on	  partiality.	  She	  insisted	  that	  we	  cannot	  proceed	  “’with	  eyes	  wide	  shut’	  –	  namely,	  in	  an	  imagined	  original	  position,	  behind	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance.”	  On	  the	  contrary,	  “the	  fair	  family	  deal	  is	  adopted	  considerately	  and	  partially,	  ‘with	  eyes	  wide	  open’	  –	  namely,	  with	  the	  family	  members	  sympathetically	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  full	  particularity	  of	  each,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  fine-­‐grained	  comparisons	  of	  preferences	  between	  them.”	  Note	  that	  in	  this	  sentence,	  the	  word	  “partially”	  is	  paired	  with	  “considerately”;	  she	  sees	  a	  form	  of	  partiality	  as	  connected	  or	  at	  least	  compatible	  with	  fairness.	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  thus	  cast	  fresh	  light	  on	  a	  puzzle	  on	  which	  she	  was	  uniquely	  positioned	  to	  make	  progress:	  the	  role	  of	  norms	  of	  considerateness,	  and	  their	  highly	  complex	  functions	  not	  only	  within	  families	  and	  other	  close-­‐knit	  units,	  but	  also	  within	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	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  note	  supra.	  
